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FUKUSHIMA: CATASTROPHE, COMPENSATION, 
AND JUSTICE IN JAPAN 
Eric A. Feldman* 
INTRODUCTION 
I am honored to take part in this year's Clifford Symposium and 
celebrate the extraordinary breadth and depth of Marc Galanter's 
scholarship. So often when I begin to explore a new research area, I 
discover that Marc has been there, sometimes decades earlier. There­
fore, it was no surprise to find that Marc's work on access to justice 
raises many of the issues that I am now confronting as I examine the 
natural and nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, and the effort by 
the victims to obtain compensation for their harms. 1 
Well before the Fukushima disaster of March 11, 201 I, governments 
in the developed world struggled with victim compensation in cases of 
environmental contamination, harms caused by pharmaceutical prod­
ucts, terrorist attacks, and more.2 All of those are important prece­
dents to Fukushima, but none of them approach the breadth of harms 
resulting from the triple disaster of huge earthquake, massive tsunami, 
and nuclear meltdown now known in Japan as 3/11. With close to 
20,000 people dead or missing, one million homes fully destroyed or 
seriously damaged, and 100,000 people displaced, getting those whose 
lives were affected by the events in Fukushima back on their feet is a 
* Eric A. Feldman is a l'rofessm of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Lnw School. The 
research and writing of this Article were supported by a University of l•ennsylvania Law School 
Summer Research Grant. I am grateful to Masayuki Murayama for inviting me to participate in 
his project "Problems of Law in Response to Disasters," which inspired this Article. and to 
Kenneth Feinberg. for talking with me about disaster compensation in the United States. 
I. See generally Marc Galanter. Wiry tlw "lltll'es" Come Ow A/read: Sprcultrtimrs on tlrt• l.im· 
its of Uga/ Clrange, 9 L\W & SoC '' Y R1.v. 95, 98, 100 (1974); Marc Galanter, Adjudication. 
Litigation, ami Refilled Plrenomrtw. in LAw AND Till' Son,u S!'II·Nns 151. 228-29 (Leon Lip­
son & Stanton Wheeler eds .• IIJ!l6) (addressing the tensions between different forms of dispute 
processing (like litigation and mediation); discussing how and why bigger and wealthier parties 
arc advantaged in legal connicts; and looking broadly at the link between the institutional struc­
ture of disputing. the nature nf parties engaged in disputes. and the outcome nf disputes). 
2. See. e.g . . Eric A. Feldman & Ronald Bayer. lmrotluction: Umlerstmuling the• 11/ood Feuds. 
in ll1.oon Fn rns: AIDS, B1 oou. A Nil 1111· I'< 11 nws or MI'I>II'AI. Dls,\s ll·lt I. 4 (Eric A. Feld­
man & Ronald Bayer eds., IIJIJIJ) [hereinafter B1 oon FHms) ; Eric A. Feldman. /1/ood Justict•: 
Courts, Conflict, mrtl Compt•n.wtiml ill Japtm, 1-'rtmce, and tire U11ited Sttii<'S, �4 LAw & Sol''Y 
REV. 651 (2000). 
lTM1 � 
335 
I 
32699!.dpl_62-2 Sheet No. 59 Side B 04/0212013 14:01:02 
336 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:335 
daunting task. How should Japanese society, and the Japanese state, 
respond? How much compensation, if any, should be offered to the 
victims? What types of losses should be considered compensable? 
Which institutions are best equipped to evaluate and manage a system 
of redress? 
I I .  DISASTER CoMPENSATION IN JAJ>AN: THE PAST 
In both industrialized and developing nations, historically and cur­
rently, accident victims are generally expected to bear the cost of their 
harms.3 In the oft-quoted language of Oliver Wendell Holmes, "[T]he 
general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where i t  
falls."4 That principle has also guided how governments approach dis­
aster victim compensation. The tendency to stand back and let victims 
manage on their own is well illustrated by the United States, with its 
tradition of individualism, deep antagonism to paternalism, and lack 
of interest in European ideas of social solidarity.5 When disasters 
strike, as they often do, the state (both national and local) has little 
inclination to offer financial compensation. From Hurricane Katrina 
to the U .S.S. Cole, Americans whose lives were crushed by disaster 
have been left to take care of themselves, even when in many cases 
they were unable to do so. 
Yet, in a number of highly visible cases, a mix of government aid 
and private largesse has been offered to disaster victims in the United 
States. The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund is perhaps the most nota­
ble example of the government articulating a vision of disaster com­
pensation as a display of national solidarity. I t  is joined by other 
disasters-the Deepwater Horizon oil spil l  and the Virginia Tech 
shootings, for example-that also triggered the creation of compensa­
tion mechanisms. Compensation in these cases has been justified in a 
number of ways-as a moral imperative to aid victims, an economic 
imperative to shield corporations from potentially crippling liability, 
and a political imperative to heal public and private wounds.6 
3. There arc, of course, some exceptions, like the no fault medical liability system in Sweden. 
See Jerome Harleston, No-Fault Medical Liability Compensation System, CoNN. GEN. AssEMIILY 
(Apr. 16 , 2003) , http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdatalins/rpt/2003-R-0386.htm. 
4. 0. W. HnU•IES, JR., Tm. CoMMON LAW 94 (1881 ) .  
5. See, e.g., 2 ALEXIS D1; TIK'OIWVn.u;, DEMOI'RA<"Y I N  AMERICA 1 20 (Henry Reeve trans., 
186 2) (")Americans) owe nothing to any man, they expect nothing from any man; they acquire 
the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to imagine that 
their whole destiny is in their own hands.") . 
6. See KENNETII R. FHNIIEIIIi, WIIAT Is Ln·l' WoRTII'!: TilE llNI•JtH'EilENTED EH'ORT To 
CoMI'ENsA·n, TilE VwnMs or 9 /1 1, at 42 (2005). 
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The disaster in Fukushima could have been the Japanese govern­
ment's 9/1 1 moment-an opportunity to offer compensation to victims 
as a symbol of national unity in a time of crisis, to help economically 
challenged victims, and to support the nuclear power industry. Doing 
so would have underscored the emphasis on social bonds, or kizuna, 
which was so heavily promoted by the government in the wake of the 
Fukushima disaster.7 It would also appear to complement a number 
of long-standing Japanese norms and practices: a legacy of central 
government control of the policy agenda, a history of state entangle­
ment in the lives of citizens, an emphasis on national values (and over­
emphasis, at least in some circumstances, on national ism), and a desire 
to communicate to the public that the success of individuals and the 
success of the nation are inseparable.8 If ever there was a time for a 
nation seen increasingly as a marginal global player to pull together, 
and for the central government to use a national tragedy to rebind the 
fraying ties of a country suffering from two decades of economic mal­
aise, Fukushima was it . 
Yet, the destruction in Fukushima did not spark a moral or political 
discussion about whether victims of mass tragedies should benefit 
from government action to compensate. Instead, in apparent defiance 
of a number of background conditions that make disaster compensa­
tion seem like a plausible option in Japan, the response to Fukushima 
underscored the absence of a compensation norm. Indeed, one is 
hard pressed to find examples in which the state has compensated be­
cause it believes that compensation is the "right" thing to do or is 
essential to some notion of solidarity; compensation schemes justified 
on political or economic grounds are also rare. 
The history of natural disasters in Japan reveals little appetite for 
compensation. In 1959, for example, the Isewan Typhoon, one of the 
worst natural disasters in Japan's history, killed over 5,000 people, in­
jured more than 40,000, and destroyed 120,000 homes.9 The govern­
ment mounted a major reconstruction effort, but did not offer any 
monetary compensation for death, injury, or property damage. Like­
wise, the 1993 earthquake in Okushiri, a small island near Hokkaido, 
was the largest in twenty-five years, causing a tsunami with waves of 
7. Japanese public opinion sur\'eys found that the kanji (written character) for ki:mw 
summed up 2011. luptmt•se Public Chooses 'Ki:mm' as Kanji of 2011. BBC N1 ws (Dec. 23. 
2011 ), http://www.bbc.eo.uk/ncws/world-asia-16321 999. 
8. Masao Maruyama, '11 1• J.ogic 111111 1'.5yclw/ogy of U/trutwtimwlism, ill Tlllllltall AND BI·-
11/\VII>I( 1s M111WRN JAI'ANI-SI' POl 1111'S I. 6 (l\'an Morris cd .• 1963). 
9. J,\1'/\N WATER FIIIUIM, TYI'IIIION ls1 W,\N (VI-.HA) ANI> l1s LI-SSIINS (2005), twuilublt· at 
http://www.watcrforum.jp/jpn/katrim•fl'yphoon_lscwan.pdf. 
0 a � 0 ... 
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ten to thirty meters. 10 Almost two hundred people were killed, and 
70% of homes on the island were destroyed. Despite the discrete geo­
graphical scope of the damage and the relatively limited number of 
victims, no government compensation was offered and victims re­
ceived only small private donations allocated by the local government. 
The most deadly earthquake of the postwar era was the 1995 Han­
shin (Kobe) earthquake, which was responsible for over 6,000 deaths, 
40,000 injuries, and almost 400,000 destroyed homes. 1 1  The fact that i t  
was an  election year may explain why the government invested heav­
ily in infrastructure reconstruction.12 Those who suffered personal in­
jury or property loss, however, received little aid beyond a charity 
payment of approximately $2,500 per family from the Japanese Red 
Cross and a small condolence payment (mimaikin) authorized by the 
Japan Legislature (Diet) as part of the reconstruction budget.D 
Compensation is no more forthcoming in other types of major acci­
dents or disasters. Flood victims, for example, are not compensated 
for their losses, even in extraordinary circumstances, nor are those 
who are harmed by environmental pollution or who suffer iatrogenic 
injuries, as the Minamata mercury pollution case and the HIV-tainted 
blood case demonstrate.14 In both of those cases, at least some vic­
tims were ultimately paid, but not without the government denying or 
10. Masayuki Nakao, Okuslriri Tsunami Generated by Southwest-off llokkaido Earthquake, 
H ATAM\JRA INSTITlJil' FOR TilE ADVANCEMENT OF TH'IINOUXiY, hllp://www.sozogaku.com/ 
fkd/cn/cfcn/CA10006 18.html (last visiJcd Feb. 17. 2013). 
II. DAvrr> W. E[)(liNOTON, REc<>NSTIUJC'I'ING Kn1w: TilE GEocmAr•uv oF Crtrsrs ANU Or•. 
I'OR'nJNITY 236 (2010). 
12. See id. at 85- 8 6  ("For some commentators, the reasons )for Japan's expenditures on infra· 
structure) had to do with the fact that 199 5 was an election year in Japan. The ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LOP) , then in a coalition with the Japan Socialist Party, felt that it would gain 
politically by providing subsidies to the Kobe region . . . .  ") . 
13. Condolence payments (nrinraikin) arc clearly distinguished from compensation because 
they arc given as an expression of sympathy rather than an effort to mnke the victim whole. For 
Kobe earthquake victims, the payments were five million yen to families that lost the head of 
household, and 2.5 million yen for those who lost a family member. The exchange rate of U .S. 
dollars to yen (as of February 17, 2013) is approximately 1: 93. Currencies Center, YAIIoo! Fr. 
NANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/currency·convcrter (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). 
14. See, e.g., FRANK K. Ur•IIAM, LAw ANI> SocrAI. CIIANcm IN PosTWAR JAPAN 30- 34 (1 987) 
("The explicit characterization of the payments as nrinraikin is further evidence of the company's 
close aJtention to the legal nature of the agreement and its determination to use legal doctrine to 
prevent continuing liability. U nder the agreement (the company) docs no more than express 
sympathy for the victims, who, in turn, forfeit all legal rights to compensation."); Feldman, .mpra 
note 2 ,  at 60, 6 9  (describing the struggle that hemophiliacs and others who had been affected by 
HIV-tainted blood in Jnpnn went through to obtain compensation for their suffering, and noting 
that, even after the compensation system was established, the government "steadfastly denied its 
responsibility for infecting hemophiliacs" ; it was only after years of litigation that the 
hemophiliacs obtained large cash selllements and an apology from the government and pharma· 
ceutical companies involved). 
I 
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obscuring its responsibility and the victims engaging in protracted le­
gal struggles. If some form of disaster insurance was the norm, it 
might explain the state's blanket refusal to compensate, but earth­
quake insurance is relatively rare and insurance against most other 
types of disasters is unavailable. 
Although the Japanese government rarely, if ever, offers compensa­
tion to victims of natural disasters, one might expect victims of terror­
ism to receive more generous treatment. Japan has experienced two 
potentially compensable terrorist events. One occurred in 1995, when 
the cult Aum Shinrikyo released highly toxic sarin nerve gas into the 
Tokyo subway system, killing twelve people, seriously injuring dozens 
more, and exposing approximately 5,500.t5 In the absence of state ac­
tion, victims successfully sued Aum, but the cult was only able to sat­
isfy 1 .5 billion yen of the court's 3.8 billion yen judgment.t6 The 
victims then turned to the state to fil l  the gap, triggering a political 
debate over the state's responsibility to the victims. The Diet ulti­
mately passed legislation enabling the government to supplement 
Aum's payments, but rejected a proposal that it authorize government 
compensation for future victims of terrorism.t7 
The second terrorist act involved the abduction of Japanese nation­
als by North Korea in the 1 970s and 1980s, in what appears to have 
been an unorthodox effort to improve North Korea's intelligence and 
surveillance system.tH In 2002, what had long been unsubstantiated 
allegations of abduction were confirmed by the North Korean govern­
ment, which issued an apology to the Japanese government and con­
firmed that five abductees were still alive. The five were repatriated 
and the Diet passed the Abductee's Support Law, which provides a 
monthly allowance of 170,000 yen per repatriated abductee, 240,000 
yen per two-person household, and an additional 30,000 yen for each 
15. See Manabu Watanabe, Religion antfl/iofence in Japan Today: A Clmmofogicaf am{ noc­
trinaf Analysis of Aum Shinrikyo. 10 TntttotttsM & PoL Vt<ll.t·Nt'E 80,/l0-81 ( 1998). 
16. See Jun !-Iongo, Aum's /Jankruptcy l'mn·<·dings to Em/13 Years On. JAt'AN TtMt·s (March 
20. 2008). hup://info.japantimes.co.jp/tcxtlnn20080320a6.html. 
17. Toshimitsu Miyai, A 11m Compensation Unresoll't!d, DAtt v Yo�uuttt, June 17. 2008, 11\'llila­
bfe at http://www .religionnewsblog.comn 16:\0/aum-compensat ion-unresolved. 
18. See gml'ral/.1' Richard J. Samuels, Kidnapping Politics in East Asia. 10 J. E. AstAN Snll>. 
363,367 (2010) (describin!\ the abduction of J;tpanese nationals by North Koren and the response 
of the Japanese gm·ernment); Celeste Arrin!\ton, Interest Group Influence in Policy-Making 
Processes: Comparing the Abductions Issue and North Korea Policy in Japan and South Korea 3 
(Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), amiftlbft• 111 http://citation.allacademic.com/ 
meta/p_mln_;tpa_rcscarch_citalionnt0/9/6/4/pages2096411p209641-l.php. 
(J) 
a: (() 
)> 
I 0 .... 
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family member.19 The Japanese government also made the repatri­
ated abductees eligible for full pension benefits. 
Both the victims of the sarin nerve gas attack and the five repatri­
ated abductees benefitted from government legislation that provided 
them with compensation, and as such, they can be seen as exceptions 
to the general norm in Japan of leaving disaster victims to fend for 
themselves. But they are exceptions of the narrowest kind. In one 
case, government compensation was offered only after victims suc­
cessfully sued a private party. In legislating compensation, the gov­
ernment supplemented the payments of a judgment-proof private 
party while making clear its disinterest in compensating victims of ter­
rorism more generally. In the other, compensation followed an ex­
traordinary political engagement between Japan and North Korea, 
and involved a highly unusual set of circumstances and a very small 
number of victims. Overall, however, one can clearly observe a non­
compensation norm that defines the state's response to natural and 
other disasters. 
I l l .  DISASTER COMPENSATION IN JAJ>AN: FUKUSHIMA 
Fukushima thus unfolded against a background that strongly sig­
naled the improbability of the government embracing the opportunity 
to create a victim compensation scheme. David Edgington observed 
two related sentiments in his fine book about the Kobe earthquake: 
that government cannot help people to reconstruct their lives, and 
that "all Japan[ese) people should be treated equally in the provision 
of government services and support. "20 However tempting a symbolic 
opportunity Fukushima offered to unify the nation in a time of crisis, 
and whatever merit there may be to the view that the structure and 
function of the Japanese state make disaster compensation plausible, 
countervailing qualities-be they a disregard for public welfare, an 
overemphasis on fiscal conservatism, a subservience to private inter­
ests, a deep commitment to individual autonomy, or others-clearly 
disincline the state to distribute financial compensation.21 Indeed, 
even a massive disaster like Fukushima sparked little debate about the 
creation of a general compensation program for those whose lives 
1 9 .  [Aid to Victims Kidnapped by North Korean Authorities!. Act No. 1 43 of 2002 (Japan), 
al•ailable at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata!H 14/H 14HOI43.html. 
20. See EI>IHNGTON, supra note 11, at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
21 .  See, e.g., David McNeill, 71u! Fukushima Nuclear Crisis and the Fight for Compensation, 
AstA-PAc. J. (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.japanfocus.orgi-David-McNeill/3707 (describing the 
compensation scheme in place and noting the lack of a government-supported comprehensive 
compensation program). 
0 � 0 � 0 ...... 
c.> 
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were affected by the earthquake and tsunami. Unlike 9/11 in the U.S., 
and the prevailing view that victims in the vicinity of the World Trade 
Center were especially deserving of government largesse, few in Japan 
framed their expressions of sympathy in the language of recompense. 
Although the government did not craft a compensation system for 
all Fukushima victims, it was forced to deal differently with one par­
ticular group. Those harmed by the nuclear accident, as distinguished 
from those whose injuries were caused by the earthquake or tsunami. 
are eligible for compensation under legislation that governs the opera­
tion of nuclear power facilities.22 Similar legislation exists in most in­
dustrialized democracies-the U.S. equivalent is the 1957 Price­
Anderson Act23-but the dearth of nuclear accidents throughout the 
world means that such legislation has rarely been invoked.24 
A. The Nuclear Damage Compensation Act 
Under the terms of Japan's 1961 Nuclear Damage Compensation 
Act (NDCA), private power providers have no-fault responsibility for 
nuclear accidents, with liability capped at 120 billion yen.25 Beyond 
that amount, the government may (but is not legally obligated to) 
shoulder the cost of compensation.26 In the aftermath of events in 
Fukushima, it was clear that a large number of people had suffered 
potentially compensable harms. Less clear was the question of who 
.!.,t�li.l:'it. 
IJI lji::::;·;;y.,� 
� �� 
22. (Nuclear Damage Compensation Act). Act No. 1�7 of 1961 (Japan). amilablt• at http:// !I,;.;S·· ::: .:</ www.oecd-nea.orgllawllegislation/japan-docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf. •:):;..;::; : 
�;u��uo�edc��.·:��;:�if::t��;��� t�:������·�i��;t�er�. ������s���� �k���:X:���r ��:::::�;�� /W;�( ..;:;/)' government has no legal obligation to compensate them, and has no plans to do so. I, .,. ,. J 23. Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, 42 lJ.S.C. § 2210 (2006). 
in the United States; however, claims from the accident failed to exceed the required private 
24. The Price-Anderson Act was in place in 1979 at the time of the Three Mile Island accident I'.· '· . . .
.
. ·:·.,1!, 1 :. ·1 liability insurance from which the first claims under the Act arc to be paid. Moreover. the m;ci-[ · .;, dent was not deemed to be an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence," which would have caused · . ·' ·J 11 ••• • 1 certain provisions under the Act to come into play. While the Three Mile Island accident was a ��: . . : .. ' .. : . ........ · ... ·.:. · ·.1) ::'j serious and tragic event, it was not of a large enough scale to fully test the functionality of the ,, .. · ·  1 Price· Anderson Act. See Leslie L1ss. Comment. The Price·.tlmlnwm Act: If a "CIIemobyf" Oc-
r, ... , .: · ·Ji wr.5 in the Unitt•d States, Will tilt• Vicrims Be Adequately Compt•nmted, 7 Gu.NJMI.I· L. RI·V. 200, 
. 
·11 
1 200-01 ( 1985): see also Nucft'l!r lnsuranct• ami /Jisaster Rl'lit•/ Punds, U.S. NRC (June 2011 ). li l http:/lwww.mc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.html. . . . J.' l 25. See (Nuclcnr Damage Compensation Act). Act No. 147 of 1961. §§ 3, 7 (Japan). al'llilaMt• I . , .. : �ct.���://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/jnp:m-docs/Japan-Nuclcar-Damage-Compensation- . .  · :···· ·) 1: · .. ·' 111,1 26. Prior to the Fukushima disaster. the ND('t\ had been triggered only once, in 1999. when a . 1; uranium reprocessing plant operated by a suhsidiary of Sumitomo Metal Mining Corporation 
I . . . . ! ;:;����n���;�����.:�o�;:gi��:.h11�;:�r�1�;s1����.:�;:��� ��::,d��;.�::�;1.;�e;1 E1�:,�.s:�1��� �:r�o;;::
· 
·�it;: . ' �l:. .ns ("OP) · · J I 1 . . . - - -. I I ·1 . I i :.·.· , .... · ·.· ·:' :· ·.; ..:· ·. ··:, .. !,·; ·:.· .. · •• :.' •. ·.,·.· .
·
·: •. ·.· ·.
1
·
1·.·.:-.. . ··.·.·.· .. · .... · ...·� ... ·� .. · ·.•.· �.·.>,·.· .............. : ..,-.·,· .. ·,:. . .. . ·---.. .. - - ·--- ;. J � _ .··�:-��.;.·T.�-·�-�-\-�:};:.�T�.:��:::·:/!:·i::\·\r�/.f;:>·:fc{f;)\.:!\\:�:\�;\��:;Fr:�·2::) .. : ..���..:�7· ··:� ��-:�:TT?:��·;_ ·:;·:�.;-�-���:-�-:�- :-��-:;�:;.;:;� � _;·:: _-_ ... ·� ·: ..·::.: ::_;��{�,�:7) Jf�; � . ...;,. .....;�:;,.· -�-_._:- · : . ....,.:.'"':\�; .. '-' . . ·_...;.;._._.._;,;�-'-"'-'-"' SJ 
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was eligible for compensation, which harms were compensable, how 
much proof should be required by those requesting compensation, 
what administrative structure was best suited to evaluating such proof 
and paying claims, and what sorts of obligations should be borne by 
claimants who received compensation. The following Parts will ad­
dress these issues in succession. 
B. Defining Eligibility 
The government's first step in creating an administrative structure 
for Fukushima claims, in keeping with the NDCA, was to assemble a 
D ispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensa­
tion. Chaired by Yoshihisa Nomi, a distinguished civil law scholar 
from Gakushuiin University, the panel consists of nine additional 
members, five of whom are prominent legal experts and four of whom 
have expertise in medicine, science, and radiation. The goal of the 
committee was to address a question at the heart of all compensation 
funds-eligibility. 
In certain circumstances, like the 9/1 1 fund in the US, a simple rule 
of proximity is used to determine eligibility, with injuries occurring 
within clearly defined geographical parameters deemed eligible and 
those beyond the parameters ineligible.27 Other cases are more diffi­
cult; when determining eligibility under the Deepwater Horizon Dis­
aster Victim Compensation Fund for damage caused by spilled oil, for 
example, administrators were confronted with claims from all fifty 
states and various foreign countries.28 Similarly, the huge toll taken 
by the Fukushima disaster first required a determination of whether 
all victims or only a subset would be eligible for compensation. 
Pragmatically, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to offer 
more than token compensation if the eligible pool were defined 
broadly. Moreover, as already noted, the possibility of an overall 
compensation program was never a serious option. Without a general 
statute mandating disaster compensation, only those affected by the 
nuclear accident would be eligible for compensation. 
Even that l imitation left a number of unanswered questions. First, 
under the terms of the NDCA, nuclear facility operators have strict, 
unlimited liability for nuclear accidents unless the accident is caused 
by a "grave natural disaster."29 Not surprisingly, the Tokyo Electric 
27. See FEINIIERO, supra note 6, at 42. 
28. Interview with Kenneth Feinberg. Administrator, Deepwater Horizon Disaster Victim 
Compensation Fund. in Wash .• D.C. (Feb. 6, 2012). 
2 9 . !Nuclear Damage Compensation Act). Act No. 147 of 1961, § 3 (Japan). available at hup:/1 
www.occd-nea.orgllaw/lcgislation/japan-docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensntion-Act.pdf. 
32699
l
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Power Company (TEPCO) did not wait long to claim that the triple 
disaster in Fukushima constituted a "grave natural disaster" and that 
it therefore had no liability. That claim appears to have had little trac­
tion with the government, which has proceeded as if liability rests with 
TEPCO and not the government.30 
Second, the NDCA anticipates that funds for compensation will be 
raised in one of two ways: through mandatory insurance (insurers are 
released from liability when accidents are caused by earthquakes or 
other natural disasters) or through an indemnity contract between the 
government and the nuclear power provider.3t With the insurer re­
leased from liability, Fukushima victims would receive compensation 
from TEPCO with funds collected by way of the indemnity contract. 
The third question left open by the NDCA is how to handle com­
pensation payments once the 120 billion yen reserve mandated by the 
NDCA is depleted. Here. the NDCA is profoundly ambiguous. Sec­
tion 16 states: "[W]hen the actual amount which he should pay for the 
nuclear damage pursuant to Section 3 exceeds the financial security 
amount and when the Government deems it necessary in order to at­
tain the objectives of this act," the government will give the nuclear 
operator "such aid as is required for him to compensate the dam­
age."32 With estimates that the cost of compensation in Fukushima 
could cost tril l ions of yen, this provision left the government with a set 
of distasteful alternatives: (1) refuse to provide additional cash to 
TEPCO, forcing the company into bankruptcy and potentially shut­
ting out many claimants; (2) take over the task of compensating 
Fukushima victims; or (3) provide money to TEPCO and require that 
the funds be repaid. Fearing the impact of bankruptcy on Japan's 
struggling economy and wanting to distance itself from direct pay­
ments to victims,33 in May 2011 the government announced a frame­
work to provide financial support to TEPC0.34 Under the plan, the 
30. Masayuki Murayama. There Are Few Cases Around Here: Lawyers' Response to Nuclear 
Compensation and Structural l'roblems of the Japanese Legal Profession (unpublished manu- ·. · _--_ -· j 
script) (on file with author). 
31. See
d
(Nuclear Damage Compensation Act). Act No. 147 of 1961 (Japan), available 111 hllp:/1 
. : 11 
www.oec -nea.org!law/legislation/japan-docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Aet.pdf. _ 
32. /d. § Hi (emphasis added). Section 3 of this Act addresses government payments if then: _ __ ,.
is an exoneration for a grave natural disaster. See id. § 3. 
33. With foreign investment in TEPCO bonds, bankruptcy would unsellle an already weak _ . .--.11 investment climate, and taking control of the compensation system would imply an undesired 
degree of state responsibility for the accident. ' 
34. Set• X. V;isque:r.-Maignan, l·itkushima: Uability and Compt•twttion, NEA N1-.ws (2011 ), I, http://www.oecd-nea.org/nca-news/2011/29-2/nea-news-29-2-fukushima-e.pdf. The Diet ap- , 
proved the plan in August 2011. See Cody Harding, Japan Lawmakers Apprmw/ f'ttktt.�himtl l ' · ·.
-
_I, Victim Compmsarion 1'/an, Jtr1us 1 (Aug. 3. 2012). hllp://jurist.org!thisday/2012/0X/japan-
1 >, ; i t - - - - - · I i · -· i ! I 
1 ._ .:_· --�-_,'. _:' __ ,i_.:--__•_-.• __ :_,_._, _:� •_' __ ..:·:.
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Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation issued gov­
ernment bonds that enabled it to provide funds to TEPCQ.35 In re­
turn, TEPCO must repay the government, cut its costs, and improve 
the Fukushima compensation procedures.36 This structure leaves both 
TEPCO and the government in an awkward position. The govern­
ment has no legal obligation to fund TEPCO's compensation fund be­
yond its 120 billion yen indemnity agreement, but it considers 
propping up TEPCO to be a better alternative than taking over the 
compensation process and paying victims directly. TEPCO, which has 
long enjoyed a cozy relationship with regulators, survives as a private 
company, but must run a complex and expensive compensation pro­
gram for victims of a nuclear accident who blame the company for 
their harms and believe that its key incentive is to pay as little com­
pensation as possible. 
Finally, the question of which types of victims would be compen­
sated had to be addressed. The government's August 2011 prelimi­
nary compensation guidelines, for example, focused on emergency 
compensation payments to those who were subject to official orders in 
the wake of the nuclear accident.3' This included people whose harms 
were caused by mandatory evacuation from areas within twenty kilo­
meters of the plant (approximately 60,000 people), the prohibition of 
navigation and flight in designated areas, limitations on the sale of 
certain products, negative publicity that caused a drop in commodity 
lawmakers-approvc-fukushima-victim-compensation-plan.php; see also Takashi Hirokawa & 
Sachiko Sakamaki, Japan to Help TEJ>CO Pay Nuclear Claims; Banb May Have to Write Off 
/)ebt, BwmtnERG (May 13, 201 1 ) .  http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/201 1 -05-13/japan·to-sup­
port-tepco-compensation.html (explaining that the Japanese government had decided to step in 
and provide aid to TEPCO, but that TEPCO would still be unlimitedly liable for damages). 
35. Vasquez-Maignan, supra note 34, at 1 1. 
36.  A Japanese newspaper described the process as follows: 
TEPCO has requested a total of 1 .01 trillion yen of financial assistance for the time 
being, including 1 20 billion yen in government compensation to be paid over the nu­
clear accident under the nuclear damage compensation law. 
The funding entity, the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund, is designed to 
support TEPCO by receiving funds through a special type of government bond that will 
carry no interest and can be cashed in when necessary, in addition to annual contribu­
tions from all utilities operating nuclear plants in Japan. 
TEPCO is obligated to eventually repay the funds provided by the body. 
G01•'t OKs /'/an to Providt> 9()0 Bil. Yetr Finatrcial Aid to TEI'CO, Kvouo NEws IN"r'L, INc., 
Nov. 4, 2011, available at http:/lwww.thcfreelibrary.com/Gov%27t+0Ks+plan+to+providc+900+ 
bil.+yen+financial+aid+totTEPCO.-all271825437; .�ee also V;isquez-Maignan, supra note 34, at 
II. 
37. Midterm Guidelines, Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensa­
tion (Aug. 201 1 ) .  Although the government's Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear 
Damage has established guidelines for compensation, requests for compensation arc submitted 
directly to TEPCO and the ultimate decisions regarding compensation lie with TEPCO. 
0 � 0 � 0 ... 
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prices, and more. In essence, those affected by state mandates were 
eligible for compensation, while others were not. 
Not surprisingly, using mandates as the determinant of eligibility 
provoked those who were excluded, particularly people living beyond 
the mandatory evacuation zone. Those living between twenty and 
thirty kilometers from the Fukushima plant, for example, were ad­
vised by the government to prepare for evacuation, but were not re­
quired to evacuate. Yet many of them, particularly families with 
children, left their homes and relocated to temporary shelters. In 
their view, they had suffered harms identical to those within the 
twenty-kilometer zone and should therefore be similarly compen­
sated. Bowing to pressure, in December 2011, the Dispute Reconcili­
ation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation supplemented 
its preliminary guidelines with a recommendation that voluntary evac­
uees in twenty-three municipalities also be compensated, adding an 
estimated 1.5 million people to the compensation-eligible pool.311 
C. Defining Compensable Harms 
Deciding who is eligible for compensation is one critical step, but 
equally important is the need to define compensable harms by distin­
guishing between losses closely linked to the nuclear accident and 
those that are distant and attenuated. Directly implicating scholarly 
debates about proximate cause, that determination is as much a mat­
ter of social policy as of legal doctrine.39 Claims from overseas fishing 
net manufacturers who sought compensation from the Deepwater Ho­
rizon Fund for their economic loss, for example, or from students in 
adjacent buildings at Virginia Tech who sought compensation for 
emotional distress, underscore the di fficultly of deciding which harms 
are compensable and which are not. 
It is easy to imagine the wide range of harms plausibly attributed to 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster for which people may seek compensa­
tion-the economic loss suffered by farmers and fishermen, the drop 
in revenue experienced by tourist attractions in the Fukushima area. 
the emotional distress felt  by those exposed to radiation, and much 
more. In  deciding which harms will trigger payment, the challenge for 
:\8. Go1·'t l'ane/ Sets N·l'tlymell/ Scope, Amomrts. DAII Y Yo�tll'RI ONitNJ (Dec. 8. 2011 ). 
http://www .yomiuri.co.jp/dy/nationalrl'l 11207005778.htm. 
39. Following German law. Japanese legal scholars generally rrame the dehnte as implicnting a 
distinction between direct and indirect harm. As one legal expert on the committee put it. ira 
fisherman suffers harm hccausc radiation prevents him from fishing. it is direct and compcnsa· 
hie: if a net maker surrers harm. it is indirect and not compensable. Early common law cases 
relied upon a similar distinction. See,''·!:·· In re l'nlemis, (1921 1 :l K.B. 560 (A.C.) (Eng.); Over­
seas Tankship (li.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r, Co. (Wt1gon Mound/), (1961 1 A.C. 388 (J.C.). 
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the government and TEPCO has been to articulate legally, politically, 
and ethically defensible l ines between compensable and noncompen­
sable injuries. 
The long latency period typical in toxic chemical exposure cases 
presents one particularly difficult dilemma. In  legal conflicts like that 
surrounding Agent Orange, the majority of claims centered on the 
possibility of future health harms to those who were exposed to the 
chemical defoliant, but had not yet suffered any ill effects.40 In 
Fukushima, similarly, many residents and workers were exposed to 
elevated levels of radiation, but few have experienced any negative 
health consequences. Some of those exposed will surely worry about 
the increased risk of getting various types of cancers, and a few will 
develop radiation-related diseases they would not have otherwise con­
tracted.41 Yet in most cases it will be impossible to know whether an 
individual cancer or disease was caused by Fukushima-related radia­
tion or had an alternative cause. Whether to compensate those who 
may get sick, what to do about the impossibility of identifying the 
cause of future cases of cancer, and how to handle the harms resulting 
from anxiety about one's future health are all implicated in the effort 
to define compensable harms. 
The most widespread harm resulting from Fukushima, suggested by 
the worry associated with latent disease, is emotional distress. The 
national trauma associated with the events in Fukushima makes it par­
ticularly difficult to determine who should be eligible for emotional 
distress compensation and what degree of emotional distress justifies 
compensation. Initially, only those who were forced to evacuate were 
eligible to receive payments for emotional harms. A standardized 
amount of 100,000 yen per person, per month was available for six 
months, dropping to 50,000 yen per month thereafter.42 Complaints 
about the decrease in the monthly payment led TEPCO to keep pay­
ments at the 100,000 yen level, but that too was controversial, with 
some lawyers pointing out that tort j udgments that included awards 
for emotional harm generally exceeded the cap set by TEPCO. Be­
cause many Fukushima victims relied upon emotional distress pay-
40. See generally Kenneth R. Feinberg, Reporting from tile Front Line-One Mediator's Expe· 
rience witll Mass Torts, 31 Lov. L.A. L. Rt,v. 359 ,368 (1998) (describing the problems associated 
with latent future claims in the Agent Orange Utigation). 
41. Recent estimates suggest that there will be relatively few cancers or other serious illnesses 
caused by the radiation that lcukcd from the Fukushima nuclear power plants. Geoff Brumficl, 
Fuk1ullima's Doses Tallied, NATURE (May 2J, 2012 ) ,  http://www.nature.comlnewslfukushima-s­
doscs-tallied-1.10686. 
42. Daniel H. Foote, Japan's ADR System for Resolving Nuclear Power-Related Damage 
Disputes 1 0  (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
0 � 0 � 0 .... c.J 
32699�dpl_62-2 Sheet No. 65 Side A 04/0212013 14:01 :02 
2013) CATASTROPHE, COMPENSATION, AND JUSTICE 347 
ments as their only source of income, the stipend level was of critical 
importance. Only in June 2012 did voluntary evacuees become eligi­
ble to receive compensation for their emotional distress, with the 
amount capped at 200,000 yen per person.4J 
In many cases, payments for property damage are of even greater 
financial importance than emotional distress payments. Tens of 
thousands of people were displaced by the nuclear accident44 and, per­
haps without exception, the value of their land has decreased precip­
itously. Some may never be able to return home due to radiation 
contamination, whereas others may not want to return to their homes 
out of fear of radiation, a preference to leave the Fukushima region, 
or for other reasons. Moreover, in cases in which property is not usea­
ble for the foreseeable future, it is unclear whether those who are 
compensated for its full value will continue to own the property or will 
be obligated to clean it up in the future.4� 
The magnitude of the costs associated with property damage and 
the difficulty of determining its fair value led TEPCO to sidestep the 
issue of property compensation for many months. Finally, in March 
2012, the government's advisory committee on compensation an­
nounced guidelines for handling property damage.46 The guidelines 
divided the area around the nuclear plant into three regions: ( l )  
where radiation levels of fifty or more millisieverts per year (ms/year) 
make property uninhabitable for five or more years; (2) where levels 
of between twenty and fifty ms/year mean that property is unlikely to 
be useable for between 1 and 5 years; and (3) where radiation levels of 
less than twenty ms/year suggest that property will be inhabitable 
within a year.·17 Implied in this scheme is that compensation payments 
43. Sec• Press Release. TEPCO, Start of Compensation l'ayouts for the Voluntary Evacuees 
from Southern Fukushima Prefecture (June II. 2012), al"clilclbit' at http://www.tepco.eo.jp/en/ 
presslcorp-com/rclease/20 12/1205326 _1870.html. 
44. See Matt Smith, RucliouCiil't' l.t'l't'/.{ Staying High off 1-ilkus!Jima Daiichi in Japan. CNN 
(Oct. 26, 2012). http://www .cnn.com/2012/1 0/25/world/asia/japan-fukushima/index.html. 
45. A lawsuit hmught hy the private owners of a golf course against TEI'CO signals the de­
gree of confusion ahout such issues. In that case. the owners of Sunfield <Jolf Cluh sought to 
impose the cost of radiation decontamination on TEPCO. TEPCO succes.\fullv defended the 
ch1im. arguing in part that it was not liahle hccausc TEI'CO no longer owned 
.
the radioactive 
pmticles, which were now cm·ering the ground and thus the property of Sunfield. Cf. Fukushima 
Golf Course l.uwsuit Against TEI'CO m.wnissc•cl. MAmwx N1 ws (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www. 
maj iroxnews.corn/20 l l / ll/14/fukushima-gulf-course-la wsuit-against-tepco-dismisscd. 
46. See McNeill • .  mpm note 21. 
47. Sc•co11d Supplement to lmerim ( ;,itlt•lines 011 Determi11111io11 of tire Scopc· of N11clear Dtlm· 
agt• Ut•sulting from tht• Accitle111 at thc• Tokyo Electric l'oll't'r Company 1-itkushima Daiichi ami 
/)aini Nuclear Power 1'/mlts, in 01u;, I Ill{ E('os. Co·<li'I·Jt,\IIIIN & D•·v., J,\I'AN's CoMI'I·NSA· 
Til IN SYSTEM FoR Nun h\lt D,'�''"a s 173, 174 (2012), tn•ailabfe at http://www.occd-nea.org/ 
law/fukushirna/7089-fukushima-compensatiun-systcrn-pp.pdf. 
. ·.··.R· 
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can be scaled to the level of radiation found in different locations, 
with the possibility of a lump sum buyout payment to those whose 
property has radiation in the 50 or more ms/year range. So far, there 
have been no official estimates of the cost of fully compensating those 
unable to return to their homes, but it is clear that compensation pay­
ments for property-related losses wil l  be extremely costly. 
Another high-cost category of harm resulting from the Fukushima 
nuclear accident is the financial loss suffered by farmers who had to 
destroy their crops or were unable to find buyers for their products. 
Formerly a highly productive agricultural area, the value of produce 
and grain grown in the vicinity of Fukushima plummeted after radia­
tion levels increased.48 The government's compensation guidelines 
addressed these losses directly, specifying that compensation would be 
offered to both those who were prohibited by government policy from 
growing or selling certain crops as well as those whose ability to sell 
their products was affected by rumors of radiation contamination and 
a corresponding loss of reputation. 
Much has been said in the academic literature about the political 
ties between Japan's agricultural cooperatives and the Liberal Demo­
cratic Party (LOP), and how the cozy relationship between them helps 
to explain both the LOP's long-standing postwar electoral success and 
the many subsidies and benefits enjoyed by farmers.49 That political 
dynamic has clearly changed with the waning power of the LD P and 
the shrinking of the agricultural sector.50 But judging from the ability 
of farmers to mobilize in the aftermath of Fukushima, at least some of 
the agriculture sector's political clout appears to be intact. Rather 
than pursue compensation individually, 100,000 farmers aggregated 
their claims through their umbrella organization, Central Union of 
Agricultural Cooperatives, or JA-Zenchu (JA) and hired an extremely 
powerful and politically effective attorney. Representing seventeen 
regional JAs and directly negotiating with TEPCO, the attorney had 
(as of March 2012) obtained almost $1.5 billion for his clients. 51 Those 
funds are considered short-term, temporary outlays and do not in­
clude the cost of decontamination or loss of use of land. Coupled with 
the recent lowering of national radiation exposure standards, those 
uncompensated loses suggest that farmers will be seeking much more 
48. Interview with Hideaki Kubori, in Tokyo, Japan (Mar. 8, 201 2 ). 
49. See, e.g., AuRELIA GH IItUE MlJUlAN, Till·. Puuncs or A<lRIClfi.TURE IN JAI'AN 37-38 
(2000). 
50. See Aurelia George Mulgan, Where Tra(/ition Meets Change: Japan's Agriculmral Politics 
in Transition, 31 J. JAI'ANESE Snm. 2 6 1, 2 6 1  (2005). 
51. Interview with Hideaki Kubori, supm note 48. $1.5 billion is roughly equal to I HlO oku 
yen. 
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compensation in the future. In contrast to those in the fishing indus­
try, who also suffered significant financial damage but are not as polit­
ically connected or organized, farmers are well positioned to prevail in 
their effort to obtain recompense. 
The compensable harms discussed thus far involve victims who 
were subject to some form of government mandate-inhabitants 
forced to evacuate or farmers prohibited from selling their crops, for 
example. But there are of course many others in the Fukushima re­
gion who were affected by the nuclear accident  and have sought com­
pensation. Under the government's first set of guidelines no 
compensation was available for such parties. When those guidelines 
were updated in December 2011, however, individuals who evacuated 
their homes voluntarily became eligible for payments to compensate 
emotional distress and increased living expenses.52 In itial, temporary 
payments covering the time from the accident until December 31, 
201 1 were capped at 400,000 yen for children and pregnant women, 
and 80,000 yen for others.53 Those seeking compensation for evacua­
tion costs and business losses were left to petition TEPCO on an indi­
vidual basis. 
D. Proof 
Determining the pool of compensation-eligible claimants and iden­
tifying the types of compensable harms is critical to the creation of a 
compensation scheme; so too is deciding upon the kind of evidence 
that must be submitted in order to obtain compensation . What bur­
den must those who believe they are el igible for compensation bear in 
showing a causal link between the nuclear meltdown and their harms'? 
What documentation must they provide to convince administrators 
that their alleged loses are real'? 
Fukushima raises complicated questions of causation that resist 
easy solution. A decline in business at a local hot spring resort, for 
example, may be explained by the fear that potential patrons have of 
radiation. But the decline may also be the result of the sl uggish econ­
omy and signal an overall change in how people are spending their 
leisure time. Even more generally, disentangling the effects of the 
earthquake, the tsunami, and the nuclear accident can be exceedingly 
difficult. How can one assess the relative causal weight of each of 
those factors when evaluating something like emotional distress? 
52. TI-:PCO Ups l'ayout for Somr Et•11mees, DAII v Yo�III IIU ONI .INE (Mar. I. 201 2). http:// 
www. ymniuri.co.jp/dy/nat ionalfl'l 2022900-B 12.htrn. 
53. It/. In Fchruary 2012. the cap for children and pregnant women incrca�cd to 600.000 yen. 
See id. 
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Cautioned by the August 2011 interim guidelines, which advised 
TEPCO to treat causation as more art than science, compensation ad­
ministrators appear to be steering clear of explicit conflicts over cau­
sation by treating them as part of the discussion of eligibility. 
When it comes to proof, the focus is instead on the seemingly more 
mechanical task of providing documentation to support one's claims. 
Even there complications can arise. In the aftermath of the Deepwa­
ter Horizon oil spill, some claimants who sought compensation for lost 
income were only able to proffer a fishing license as proof of their 
loss. 54 Similarly, although the interim guidelines counseled TEPCO to 
relax formal evidentiary standards when it was "necessary and reason­
able" to do so, some Fukushima claimants, their homes leveled by the 
earthquake, washed away by the tsunami, or otherwise uninhabitable, 
have complained that the requirement to submit original documents 
to demonstrate financial loss was an unreasonable burden. Eviden­
tiary standards in such cases have sometimes been relaxed, but ques­
tions remain about how to assess lost income, property damage, and 
other losses in the absence of good documentation. 
E. lnfmstruclllre 
Defining the eligible class of claimants, the range of compensable 
harms, and the proof required to demonstrate harms all raise difficult 
legal, ethical, and policy questions. They are also all dependent upon 
an equally challenging task; creating the necessary administrative 
structure for evaluating claims and tendering payments has raised the 
most vexing issues. Through what process, for example, can one apply 
for compensation? Who evaluates claims? How can one ensure that 
similarly situated claimants will receive similar awards? As in most 
legal institutions, the goals here include efficiency, effectiveness, 
transparency, accountability, and justice. But how to achieve them is 
not at all clear. 
Rather than set up a unitary compensation system for all possible 
claims and claimants, Fukushima victims can follow three separate 
routes. The largest-run by TEPCO and staffed by over 10,000 peo­
ple, including 3,000 TEPCO employees and several hundred attor­
neys55-is known as the direct route to compensation. Largely 
adhering to the guidelines of the Dispute Reconciliation Committee 
for Nuclear Damage Compensation, this approach to compensation is 
meant to address the majority of losses caused by the nuclear acci-
54. Interview with Kenneth Feinberg, supra note 28 . 
55. The data in this Part were current as of spring, 201 2.  
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dent. Although payments under this approach are meant to be stan­
dardized, the guidelines generally suggest a range rather than a 
precise amount, leaving TEPCO a good deal of discretion in its deter­
mination of compensation awards. As of March 2012, TEPCO had 
paid 25,700 claims to individuals and 21,400 to corporations through 
this process. There were approximately 10,000 pending claims. 
Why have relatively few of the 150,000 evacuees sought compensa­
tion thus far? Among the explanations is the cumbersome application 
process that initially required the submission of a sixty-page claim 
form, which was cut back to thirty-four pages after an initial outcry 
about its length.56 No electronic filing of claims is permitted, which 
can make it difficult for some victims to submit their forms.57 I n  addi­
tion, some evacuees and affected businesses have stated that they re­
fuse to engage with TEPCO, whom they blame for the nuclear 
accident; that the compensation amounts being offered are too mea­
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for categories of damages not clearly addressed by the guidelines. 
Approximately 20% of claimants using ADR have hired attorneys, 
who generally charge a 10,000 yen retainer and receive 5% of the 
value of the award. Although class action claims do not exist in Japan, 
some attorneys have been able to bundle multiple cases into a single 
action; one such action includes 130 evacuees seeking compensation 
for the cost of evacuation, lost wages, and emotional d istress. An­
other suit brought together thirty-three people negotiating for prop­
erty damage payments. 
One of the first cases resolved through ADR hints at how the pro­
cess operates. The claimant lived five kilometers from the Fukushima 
nuclear power plant, and because she was unable to return to her 
home she sought compensation for property loss. No compensation 
was available through the "direct" process; TEPCO's view was that 
because high levels of radiation made it impossible to inspect her 
home compensation was premature. The claimant brought her claim 
through ADR, seeking payment for the value of her home, personal 
effects, and emotional distress. ADR mediators set the award for 
property damage at 50% of the most recent tax assessment, leading to 
speculation that future awards for property damage might take a simi­
lar approach.60 
The ADR route to compensation has encountered a number of pro­
cedural difficulties. Initially, the hope was that all claims would be 
reviewed by a panel of three mediators, but with hundreds of cases 
filed each month and a growing backlog of cases, mediators have been 
left to evaluate claims on their own.61 Similarly, what was supposed to 
be an extremely quick process lasting less than three months has be­
come increasingly slow, and the fact that proceedings are conducted 
behind closed doors with little transparency limits their precedential 
value.62 Mediators worry about inconsistency and try to avoid it 
through internal case discussions, but it remains difficult for those 
outside of the process to predict how potential claims will be settled. 
Because the resolution of ADR cases requires TEPCO's assent, 
some lawyers have suggested that it is faster and more profitable to 
sidestep ADR and utilize a third approach to obtaining compensa-
60. Interview with Junichiro Makita, Attorney at Law, Harago & Partners Law Offices, in 
Tokyo, Japan (Mar. 8, 2012). 
61.  Chico Harlan, Nuclear Redress Will Never Approximate Losses, Jt.l't.N TIMES (June 27, 
201 2) , http://aws.japantimcs.co.jp/news/201 2/06127/ncws/nuclcar-rcdrcss-will·never·approximatc· 
losses. There were 200-300 new cases filed every month as of March 201 2 ,  and a backlog of 
roughly 1 , 1 00 cases. The pace of filings has continued to accelerate. 
62. Parties an: permitted to publicize the results of their claims, and the law stipulates that the 
ADR center may publicize the outcome of "important" cases. 
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tion-litigation. Suing TEPCO is an available option for all affected 
parties, both individuals and corporations, and one might think that it 
would be an attractive option given the emerging evidence of poten­
tial carelessness in managing the nuclear reactors.63 But judging from 
the small number of cases that have been publicized, parties may have 
concluded that "direct" compensation and ADR are the better ap­
proaches.64 In fact, nothing precludes the possibility of parties pursu­
ing multiple routes to compensation. One can simultaneously bring a 
claim directly to TEPCO, file through ADR, and litigate. It is difficult 
to know whether parties are pursuing the first two routes concur­
rently, but at least at this point in time they do not appear to see 
litigation as an attractive option.M 
For all Fukushima victims, finding legal representation appears to 
be a challenge. Attorneys are unevenly distributed in Japan, with half 
of all practicing lawyers located in Tokyo and very few in rural areas 
like Fukushima.66 Believing that there was unmet demand in 
Fukushima and that outreach to potential clients in shelters was nec­
essary, some lawyers in the Tokyo area (particularly those with an in­
clination to public service) travelled to Fukushima to offer their 
services.67 They were quickly rebuffed by the local bar association, 
which did not want lawyers from outside the area to set up regional 
offices and argued that there was no unmet demand for legal services 
to justify their presence. The clash between local and outside attor­
neys may have been in part about legal fees, but it was primarily a 
conflict of legal cultures. With the more entrepreneurial Tokyo law­
yers wanting to seek out clients and the rural Fukushima lawyers argu­
ing that such an approach was unprofessional, their disagreement 
could only be resolved by appeal to the JFBA and the courts, a pro­
cess that would be time-consuming and contentious.68 Consequently, 
63. Malcolm Grimston, Viell'fJOitll: Ctm Japan Learn l.t•ssmts from the Fukushima Disaster. 
BBC Nt ws (July 6, 20 1 2). htlp://www.bbc.eo.uk/ncws/world-asia-lll72R421 (noting that a "string 
of errors" and "willful negligence" left TEI'CO's Fukushima plant unprepared for the nuclear 
disaster). 
64. Chico Harlan, Jupan's Nuclear Crisis Victim.� Left l·i•w Options for Compensation, BosToN 
Gt ollt·, July I .  20 1 2, at A4 (noting the "dearth" of lawsuits filed in the wake of the nuclear 
disaster). 
65. /d. 
66. Norimitsu Onishi. l.ttwyt•rs in Rum/ Japtm: Loll' Supply. lfh· /Jt•mmu/, N.Y. TtMFS, July 
29, 200R, at A 10 ("J II Jalf of .Iapan's lawyct·s arc concentrated in Tokyo. leaving only one lawyer 
for C\'ery 30.000 Japanese ou1Side the capital . . . .  "). 
67. See Robert B. Lcnar ct al.. /Iuman Plot.mm, Legal l·ilflout: lttptm 's Tswumti ami Nuclt'ar 
Mdttlmm. 27 J. ENVII . L. & L1 1 u ;. 1 07. 11 5 (2012). 
6R. Legally. Tokyo lawyers practicing in Fukushima arc required to register with the local har. 
and the Fukushinw bar can keep them out if they arc deemed "inappropriate." With the 
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the Tokyo lawyers returned home and the Fukushima victims were 
left to rely primarily on local counsel .69 
Finally, one additional factor further complicates the process of vic­
tim compensation. For more than a year, TEPCO's emphasis was on 
temporary, serial awards rather than on lump sum payments. The re­
sult was that victims were unable to tender their claims, receive com­
pensation, and get on with their lives. Instead, they were pulled into a 
cycle of claiming and compensation, with little end in sight. The logic 
of temporary payments is clear-the nuclear disaster is still unfolding, 
evacuee costs remain uncertain, business losses are ongoing, property 
damage is difficult to assess, and lost wages are mounting. But that 
logic is only part of the reason for the failure to offer single, final 
payments. Equally if not more important is the fact that TEPCO 
oversees all aspects of the compensation process and lump sum pay­
ments to victims would exact a huge financial cost on the company 
(and, by extension, on the government). It is better to bear the in­
creased administrative costs of the compensation program than to pay 
out a large amount of money up front, especially because at least 
some victims will inevitably give up rather than continue to file com­
pensation claims. 
F. . Claimant Responsibility 
Most compensation schemes impose obligations on victims. Often, 
at least in the U.S., claimants are given the option of either accepting 
or rejecting a compensation offer. If they accept it, they give up the 
right to litigate, whereas rejecting the offer enables them to sue. The 
first draft of the Fukushima compensation guidelines included a simi­
lar provision, which was met with immediate opposition.70 The provi­
sion was abandoned and Fukushima claimants obtained the right to 
simultaneously pursue multiple avenues to compensation. A claimant 
may seek and be awarded "direct" payments, for example, and then 
use the funds to hire a lawyer to sue TEPCO. Presumably, there will 
be offsets so that compensation is tendered from only one source for 
any given loss. But it is nonetheless unusual that claimants in 
Fukushima are under few constraints when i t  comes to bringing their 
disputes through different channels. 
Fukushima bar threatening to take the case first to the JFBA and then up to the Supreme Court 
of Japan, a resolution would take considerable time. 
6 9 .  Recently a Tokyo firm was allowed to, and did, set up an office in Fukushima. 
70. Murayama, supra note 30. 
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IV. CoNCLUSION 
The Fukushima compensation process is still in the early stages, so 
it is premature to reach any hard and fast conclusions. Provisionally. 
however, a few general comments are in order. First , the approach to 
compensation in Fukushima is consonant with the general norm that 
governs disaster compensation in Japan: compensate if the law re­
quires, but not otherwise; compensate symbolically, but not enough to 
truly cover losses; compensate uniformly, but not tailored to individ­
ual loss. 
Second, the architecture of the compensation system makes it ex­
tremely difficult for potential claimants to figure out which route to 
payment is most appropriate to their losses and needs. Because the 
legislation leaves those most directly responsible for the accident-the 
nuclear power industry-in charge of meting out payments, the com­
pensation process is ad hoc and deeply political .  Key decisions about 
eligibility have been made behind closed doors by committees of elites 
that lack transparency or accountability. The result is an extremely 
unwieldy and expensive administrative structure that impedes rather 
than facilitates compensation, fueling the view that the needs of the 
government and TEPCO, not the needs of victims, predominate. 
Third and most generally. as politicians, the energy industry, attor­
neys, and activists debate the design of the Fukushima compensation 
system, it is clear that the needs of victims are not being met. Evacua­
tion centers arc full of individuals and families who arc unable to re­
turn to their contaminated homes, but lack the financial means to start 
new lives elsewhere. Widespread emotional trauma has been largely 
untreated. Those who have received compensation have generally 
been awarded only small. temporary payments. Energy rate hikes and 
nuclear plant restarts have dominated the news, whi le the needs of the 
Fukushima victims have receded into the background. When seen 
through the lens of access to justice that Marc Galanter has so impor­
tantly emphasized, it is clear that much remains to be accomplished in 
Japan's northern provinces. 
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